The philosophy
of animal rights
Tom Regan
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2026 (CC BY 4.0)
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Preface by David Sztybel
I have been a vegan animal rights activist for some 37 years. I was
fortunate enough that my university education included a treatment of Tom
Regan’s work. The latter was closely studied at the University of Toronto in my
doctoral dissertation, “Empathy and Rationality in Ethics.” I had the privilege
of seeing Professor Regan speak at numerous conferences. As with his writings,
I was given the unmistakeable sense that I was learning from a truly great
thinker. The superb quality of writing in this pamphlet is found and flourishes
in his many philosophical books, the key classic of which is The Case for
Animal Rights. I revere his works, but also question them, in the classic
philosophical tradition.
The latter book operates in the tradition of individual rights, but
breaks with the old cultural habit of only seriously considering rights
for human beings. Yet anyone who takes animals seriously cannot fail to find
deep seriousness in Regan’s individual rights ideas found in this
pamphlet. Animals’ lives are important to them, regardless of their use-values
for humans, Regan affirms. Animals have independent value, we are
told. They are not merely tools or resources. What happens to animals matters
to them, as Dr. Regan observes. Also, each animal equally has a
life that can go for better or for worse for them, and so deserves equal
rights. Therefore, Regan proposes that we extend principles of justice to
include animals, and grant them the fundamental right to respect – from which
all other rights flow. This focus on individual rights is still epochal,
undiminished by contempt even for human rights that is now becoming a
stronger force in global affairs.
Aside from individual rights for animals, which Regan defends
memorably and potently, his pamphlet contains what I call “echoables.” These
are ideas and themes that resonate with people who take rights and
respect seriously. They are points which Regan focuses on that arguably should
echo with gravity for everyone. Women and blacks do not exist to serve others,
nor do animals. No one principled is happy with “arbitrary discrimination,”
unjust prejudices, nor selfishness. These notes strike common chords with all
of those people who realize in these dire days, following Regan’s death in
2017, that we have no right to give up on rights. When the world becomes
hard, so must our moral determination. Dr. Regan would agree.
Yet in writing a pamphlet called “The” Philosophy of Animal Rights,
we need not accept that Regan’s work is perfected and serviceable in all ways
for all time. Fundamental moral questions remain. Regan would not have signed
on with Sweden’s Animal Welfare Act of 1988, which tried to make important
inroads against factory farming of hogs among other reforms. Sows were already
not confined to force nursing. With the new Act though, pigs in general are
mandated to have freedom of movement rather than tight stalls, access to straw
and other bedding, group housing to end separation and isolation of these
highly social animals, and no more pig tail docking and teeth cutting, although
castration practices remained. Still, these measures eliminated great sufferings.
To be clear, Sweden did not ban all forms of factory farming. Should the
particular sufferings and deaths of animals in Sweden not have been addressed
at that time in that way, even given real shortcomings of the bill? In general,
animals die much more in intensive agriculture. Mortality rates easily stray up
to 15% while still maximizing profits. We may still remain determined to usher
in animal rights when the world is finally ready for such a state of
affairs. Now it is great for lucky “in-animals” when they flourish while
shielded by noble animal rights ideals in activist homes and sanctuaries.
However, it is atrocious when unfortunate “out-animals” unjustly
suffer the absolute atrocities of factory farming.
Regan writes about the importance of compassion, empathy, and
sympathy in this pamphlet. But The Case for Animal Rights rather mirrors
the following sentence, also from the pamphlet itself: “The philosophy of
animal rights demands only that logic be respected.” Regan does not emphasize caring
in his flagship book, as many feminists object. Now someone could easily agree
that Regan is utterly logically self-consistent, while that same judge fails
to care much at all about animals. That would leave the animals with
virtually nothing helpful. Yet caring has its own worries in
ethics too. If you empathetically “mirror” someone, a common theme in care
ethics, of what worth is that if they are corrupt or cruel? Purely
logical ideas and purely sympathetic feelings both lead to moral problems. Can
we do better in a single, coherent philosophy?
And what “animals” count in animal rights? Regan deserves much
applause on this score. Regan is wise to advocate rights for dogs but not
rights for amoebas. Yet the pain of slugs should be considered too, as
he is careful to suggest. In his book he works very hard to justify his stance
on which animals count morally – “subjects of a life,” as he calls them –
although important questions remain. Yet with philosophy, is it not a truism to
note that there are always important questions to ask and to consider? Let us
inquire further then, ideally considering animals with something akin to
Regan’s “respect principle,” as he finely phrased it in The Case for Animal
Rights...
Dr. David Sztybel
Maberly, Ontario, Canada
January 2026
Preface by Marly Winckler
The text The Philosophy of Animal Rights, by Tom Regan,
originally published in 1989, systematizes and disseminates, in more accessible
language, the thesis originally developed in his book The Case for Animal
Rights (1983), one of the most rigorous, coherent, and demanding
formulations of animal rights ethics. Regan’s work is part of an already
consolidated debate, in which the publication of Animal Liberation, by
Peter Singer, in 1975, constitutes a fundamental landmark. Both The Case for
Animal Rights and its later synthesis therefore emerge in a context in
which animal sentience, the problem of suffering, and the critique of
speciesism were already well established within the philosophical field.
Regan takes a step further by formulating a theory of animal rights
based on the concept of inherent value and the notion of “subjects-of-a-life.”
This formulation does not merely criticize particularly cruel practices but
calls into question the very moral legitimacy of animal exploitation as such,
rejecting any treatment that reduces these individuals to mere means for human
ends.
However, more than three decades after the publication of this
text—and fifty years after Animal Liberation—we are confronted by an
uncomfortable historical contradiction: never has so much scientific and
philosophical knowledge been produced in the field of animal ethics, and at the
same time never have so many animals been exploited on an industrial scale as
today. Theoretical clarity has advanced extraordinarily; however, social
consciousness and political structures have remained far short of this progress.
Since the 1970s, solid arguments have robustly established animal
sentience, dismantled speciesism, and demonstrated the moral incoherence of
systems based on the instrumentalization of sentient beings. On the
intellectual plane, the ethical legitimacy of animal exploitation has been
profoundly shaken. Yet this conceptual revolution has not translated into
structural transformation of society.
The general population, although more informed,
remains largely integrated into cultural and dietary patterns that depend on
animal exploitation. The same is true of political, economic, artistic, and
religious elites, who have for the most part kept their habits, discourses, and
alliances intact. Animal suffering has become more visible, but not a priority;
better known, but not central.
This gap can be explained in part
by the persistent absence of moral education on animal rights, which remains
strikingly uncommon even within higher education. Students at universities or
colleges are unlikely to receive any substantial or systematic exposure to
animal ethics or rights-based arguments, and for those who complete such
programmes — or who never access postsecondary education at all — these issues
are even further removed from reach. Outside of specialised academic or
activist circles, arguments grounded in animal rights are largely absent from
mainstream media and public discourse. However, this gap manifests most forcefully at
the political-institutional level, where, in many countries,
legislative bodies are heavily influenced — and often effectively captured — by
powerful economic interest groups, particularly agribusiness and the
agro-industrial complex. Sectors whose economic viability is directly tied
to animal exploitation exert decisive influence over elections, legislative
agendas, and public policies, reinforcing the disconnect between ethical
awareness and structural change.
This configuration transforms the debate about animal rights into
an almost forbidden terrain, in which ethical proposals collide head-on with
entrenched economic interests, resulting in slow and discontinuous progress.
Even initiatives like Meatless Monday, which proposes reducing consumption of
animal products, become targets of disproportionate reactions precisely because
of their symbolic and educational character. This resistance is not explained
by the immediate practical impact of the proposal, but because it breaks,
even if for one day, with the naturalization of exploitation and exposes the
concrete possibility of alternative dietary and cultural models.
This pattern of reaction and resistance reveals a crucial fact:
ethical advances in the field of animal rights still depend more on exceptional
historical windows of opportunity than on permanent structures of justice. When
these exceptional windows close, regression or stagnation tends to prevail.
What should constitute ongoing public policy frequently becomes an isolated
episode; what ought to be a right is often only a temporary measure.
It is here that a tension emerges that we cannot avoid. Tom Regan
is right in his moral diagnosis; however, historical experience suggests that
demanding everything as a precondition for action often results in advancing
very little—or almost nothing. To this is added a recurring phenomenon in
political and ethical movements: criticisms directed not at external
opponents, but at transitional initiatives coming from within the animal rights
field itself. Far from strengthening the cause of animal advocacy, such
dynamics tend to fragment even further an already politically fragile movement,
transforming potential convergences into internal dissent, weakening the
capacity for collective action, and wasting significant opportunities to build
common ground for effectively helping animals.
Given this, the question becomes unavoidable: should we abstain
from action simply because we cannot yet achieve everything at once? For Regan,
gradual reforms tend to prolong injustice by legitimizing structures that ought
to be abolished. Historical experience, however, suggests that suspending or
delegitimizing effective, measurable, and politically transformative actions in
the name of the purity of the ideal means, in practice, accepting the integral
continuity of the very harm one claims to combat.
Maintaining the abolition of animal use and exploitation as a
normative horizon is fundamental. But confusing the horizon with an immediate
requirement for action can convert ethical coherence into political paralysis.
Between accepting injustice as it is and demanding its immediate abolition,
there exists an intermediate path. Along this path—imperfect, contested,
gradual—people change their habits and the very way animals are perceived
begins to change. This path does not relativize the injustice of animal
exploitation; it merely recognizes that a moral argument, however correct it
may be, does not automatically convert into historical change.
Transformations of this type depend on concrete political struggles.
Discrediting this transitional space does not accelerate animal liberation; it
only prolongs the status quo.
Each meal without animal-derived products served in a public school
is not a trivial gesture. It is a tangible experience that educates the
palate, normalizes alternatives, shifts cultural references, and expands the
realm of possibility. This does not replace the abolition of animal
exploitation—but it prepares the ground so that it ceases to seem
unthinkable. Rejecting effective transitional measures in the name of
theoretical purity means denying concrete help to animals suffering in the
present—a stance we would hardly accept when it comes to injustices committed
against human beings. This double standard reveals a speciesist bias and a
detachment from the reality lived by the animals themselves.
Tom Regan’s text remains an indispensable ethical beacon by clearly
affirming that animal exploitation is an injustice that must be abolished, not
merely reformed. On the moral plane, his diagnosis is unequivocal; on the
historical and political plane, however, the clarity of the ideal does not
automatically translate into social transformation. Between the affirmation
of principle and the effective change of practices, it is necessary to build
bridges, even if provisional and imperfect. Refusing to construct such
intermediary steps in the name of absolute coherence may preserve the integrity
of moral discourse, but it does not alter public policies, does not modify
social practices, nor does it reduce the real and immediate suffering of
billions of animals.
Marly Winckler
Florianópolis, Brazil
January 2026
The philosophy of animal rights
Tom Regan
The animal rights position
The other
animals humans eat, use in science, hunt, trap, and exploit in a variety of
ways, have a life of their own that is of importance to them apart from their
utility to us. They are not only in the world, they are aware of it. What
happens to them matters to them. Each has a life that fares better or worse for
the one whose life it is.
That life
includes a variety of biological, individual, and social needs. The
satisfaction of these needs is a source of pleasure, their frustration or
abuse, a source of pain. In these fundamental ways the nonhuman animals in labs
and on farms, for example, are the same as human beings. And so it is that the
ethics of our dealings with them, and with one another, must acknowledge the
same fundamental moral principles.
At its deepest
level, human ethics is based on the independent value of the individual: The
moral worth of any one human being is not to be measured by how useful that
person is in advancing the interests of other human beings. To treat human
beings in ways that do not honor their independent value is to violate that
most basic of human rights: the right of each person to be treated with
respect.
The philosophy
of animal rights demands only that logic be respected. For any argument that
plausibly explains the independent value of human beings implies that other
animals have this same value, and have it equally. And any argument that
plausibly explains the right of humans to be treated with respect also implies
that these other animals have this same right, and have it equally, too.
It is true,
therefore, that women do not exist to serve men, blacks to serve whites, the
poor to serve the rich, or the weak to serve the strong. The philosophy of
animal rights not only accepts these truths, it insists upon and justifies
them. But this philosophy goes further. By insisting upon and justifying the
independent value and rights of other animals, it gives scientifically informed
and morally impartial reasons for denying that these animals exist to serve us.
Once this truth
is acknowledged, it is easy to understand why the philosophy of animal rights
is uncompromising in its response to each and every injustice other animals are
made to suffer. It is not larger, cleaner cages that justice demands in the
case of animals used in science, for example, but empty cages; not
“traditional” animal agriculture, but a complete end to all commerce in the
flesh of dead animals; not “more humane” hunting and trapping, but the total
eradication of these barbarous practices.
For when an
injustice is absolute, one must oppose it absolutely. It was not “reformed”
slavery that justice demanded, not “reformed” child labor, not “reformed”
subjugation of women. In each of these cases, abolition was the only moral
answer. Merely to reform absolute injustice is to prolong injustice.
The philosophy
of animal rights demands this same answer—abolition—in response to the unjust
exploitation of other animals. It is not the details of unjust exploitation
that must be changed. It is the unjust exploitation itself that must be ended,
whether on the farm, in the lab, or among the wild, for example. The philosophy
of animal rights asks for nothing more, but neither will it be satisfied with
anything less.
10 reasons for animal rights and their explanations
1. The
philosophy of animal rights is rational.
Explanation: It is not
rational to discriminate arbitrarily. And discrimination against nonhuman
animals is arbitrary. It is wrong to treat weaker human beings, especially
those who are lacking in normal human intelligence, as “tools” or “renewable
resources” or “models” or “commodities.” It cannot be right, therefore, to
treat other animals as if they were “tools,” “models” and the like, if their
psychology is as rich as (or richer than) these humans. To think otherwise is
irrational.
“To describe an
animal as a physico-chemical system of extreme complexity is no doubt perfectly
correct, except that it misses out on the ‘animalness’ of the animal.” (E. F.
Schumacher)
2. The
philosophy of animal rights is scientific.
Explanation: The philosophy
of animal rights is respectful of our best science in general and evolutionary
biology in particular. The latter teaches that, in Darwin’s words, humans
differ from many other animals “in degree, not in kind.” Questions of line
drawing to one side, it is obvious that the animals used in laboratories,
raised for food, and hunted for pleasure or trapped for profit, for example,
are our psychological kin. This is not fantasy, this is fact, proven by our
best science.
“There is no
fundamental difference between humans and the higher mammals in their mental
faculties.” (Charles Darwin)
3. The
philosophy of animal rights is unprejudiced.
Explanation: Racists are
people who think that the members of their race are superior to the members of
other races simply because the former belong to their (the “superior”) race.
Sexists believe that the members of their sex are superior to the members of
the opposite sex simply because the former belong to their (the “superior”)
sex. Both racism and sexism are paradigms of unsupportable bigotry. There is no
“superior” or “inferior” sex or race. Racial and sexual differences are [social
and] biological, not moral, differences.
The same is
true of speciesism—the view that members of the species Homo sapiens are
superior to members of every other species simply because human beings belong
to one’s own (the “superior”) species. For there is no “superior” species. To
think otherwise is to be no less prejudiced than racists or sexists.
“If you can
justify killing to eat meat, you can justify the conditions of the ghetto. I
cannot justify either one.” (Dick Gregory)
4. The
philosophy of animal rights is just.
Explanation: Justice is the
highest principle of ethics. We are not to commit or permit injustice so that
good may come, not to violate the rights of the few so that the many might
benefit. Slavery allowed this. Child labor allowed this. Most examples of
social injustice allow this. But not the philosophy of animal rights, whose
highest principle is that of justice: No one has a right to benefit as a result
of violating another’s rights, whether that “other” is a human being or some
other animal.
“The reasons
for legal intervention in favor of children apply not less strongly to the case
of those unfortunate slaves—the (other) animals.” (John Stuart Mill)
5. The
philosophy of animal rights is compassionate.
Explanation: A full human
life demands feelings of empathy and sympathy—in a word, compassion for the
victims of injustice, whether the victims are humans or other animals. The
philosophy of animal rights calls for, and its acceptance fosters the growth
of, the virtue of compassion. This philosophy is, in Lincoln’s words, “the way
of a whole human being.”
“Compassion in
action may be the glorious possibility that could protect our crowded, polluted
planet...” (Victoria Moran)
6. The
philosophy of animal rights is unselfish.
Explanation: The philosophy
of animal rights demands a commitment to serve those who are weak and
vulnerable—those who, whether they are humans or other animals, lack the
ability to speak for or defend themselves, and who are in need of protection
against human greed and callousness. This philosophy requires this commitment,
not because it is in our self-interest to give it, but because it is right to
do so. This philosophy therefore calls for, and its acceptance fosters the
growth of, unselfish service.
“We need a
moral philosophy in which the concept of love, so rarely mentioned now by
philosophers, can once again be made central.” (Iris Murdoch)
7. The
philosophy of animal rights is individually fulfilling.
Explanation: All the great
traditions in ethics, both secular and religious, emphasize the importance of
four things: knowledge, justice, compassion, and autonomy. The philosophy of
animal rights is no exception. This philosophy teaches that our choices should
be based on knowledge, should be expressive of compassion and justice, and
should be freely made. It is not easy to achieve these virtues, or to control
the human inclinations toward greed and indifference. But a whole human life is
impossible without them. The philosophy of animal rights both calls for, and
its acceptance fosters the growth of, individual self-fulfillment.
“Humaneness is
not a dead external precept, but a living impulse from within; not
self-sacrifice, but self-fulfillment.” (Henry Salt)
8. The
philosophy of animal rights is socially progressive.
Explanation: The greatest
impediment to the flourishing of human society is the exploitation of other
animals at human hands. This is true in the case of unhealthy diets, of the
habitual reliance on the “whole animal model” in science, and of the many other
forms animal exploitation takes. And it is no less true of education and
advertising, for example, which help deaden the human psyche to the demands of
reason, impartiality, compassion, and justice. In all these ways (and more),
nations remain profoundly backward because they fail to serve the true
interests of their citizens.
“The greatness
of a nation and its moral progress can be measured by the way its animals are
treated.” (Mahatma Gandhi)
9. The
philosophy of animal rights is environmentally wise.
Explanation: The major
cause of environmental degradation, including the greenhouse effect, water
pollution, and the loss of both arable land and top soil, for example, can be
traced to the exploitation of animals. This same pattern exists throughout the
broad range of environmental problems, from acid rain and ocean dumping of
toxic wastes, to air pollution and the destruction of natural habitat. In all
these cases, to act to protect the affected animals (who are, after all, the
first to suffer and die from these environmental ills), is to act to protect
the earth.
“Until we
establish a felt sense of kinship between our own species and those fellow
mortals who share with us the sun and shadow of life on this agonized planet,
there is no hope for other species, there is no hope for the environment, and
there is no hope for ourselves.” (Jon Wynne-Tyson)
10. The
philosophy of animal rights is peace-loving.
Explanation: The
fundamental demand of the philosophy of animal rights is to treat humans and
other animals with respect. To do this requires that we not harm anyone just so
that we ourselves or others might benefit. This philosophy therefore is totally
opposed to military aggression. It is a philosophy of peace. But it is a
philosophy that extends the demand for peace beyond the boundaries of our
species. For there is a war being waged, every day, against countless millions
of nonhuman animals. To stand truly for peace is to stand firmly against
speciesism. It is wishful thinking to believe that there can be “peace in the
world” if we fail to bring peace to our dealings with other animals.
“If by some
miracle in all our struggle the earth is spared from nuclear CATASTROPHE, only
justice to every living thing will save humankind.” (Alice Walker)
10 reasons against animal rights and their replies
1. You are
equating animals and humans, when, in fact, humans and animals differ greatly.
Reply: We are not
saying that humans and other animals are equal in every way. For example, we
are not saying that dogs and cats can do calculus, or that pigs and cows enjoy
poetry. What we are saying is that, like humans, many other animals are
psychological beings, with an experiential welfare of their own. In this sense,
we and they are the same. In this sense, therefore, despite our many
differences, we and they are equal.
“All the
arguments to prove man’s superiority cannot shatter this hard fact: in
suffering, the animals are our equals.” (Peter Singer)
2. You are
saying that every human and every other animal has the same rights, which is
absurd. Chickens cannot have the right to vote, nor can pigs have a right to
higher education.
Reply: We are not
saying that humans and other animals always have the same rights. Not even all
human beings have the same rights. For example, people with serious mental
disadvantages do not have a right to higher education. What we are saying is
that these and other humans share a basic moral right with other
animals—namely, the right to be treated with respect.
“It is the fate
of every truth to be an object of ridicule when it is first acclaimed.” (Albert
Schweitzer)
3. If animals
have rights, then so do vegetables, which is absurd.
Reply: Many animals
are like us: they have a psychological welfare of their own. Like us,
therefore, these animals have a right to be treated with respect. On the other
hand, we have no reason, and certainly no scientific one, to believe that
carrots and tomatoes, for example, bring a psychological presence to the world.
Like all other vegetables, carrots and tomatoes lack anything resembling a
brain or central nervous system. Because they are deficient in these respects,
there is no reason to think of vegetables as psychological beings, with the
capacity to experience pleasure and pain, for example. It is for these reasons
that one can rationally affirm rights in the case of animals and deny them in
the case of vegetables.
“The case for
animal rights depends only on the need for sentiency.” (Andrew Linzey)
4. Where do you
draw the line? If primates and rodents have rights, then so do slugs and
amoebas, which is absurd.
Reply: It often is
not easy to know exactly where to “draw the line.” For example, we cannot say
exactly how old someone must be to be old, or how tall someone must be to be
tall. However, we can say, with certainty, that someone who is eighty-eight is
old, and that another person who is 7’1” is tall. Similarly, we cannot say
exactly where to draw the line when it comes to those animals who have a
psychology. But we can say with absolute certainty that, wherever one draws the
line on scientific grounds, primates and rodents are on one side of it (the
psychological side), whereas slugs and amoebas are on the other which does not
mean that we may destroy them unthinkingly.
“In the
relations of humans with the animals, with the flowers, with all the objects of
creation, there is a whole great ethic scarcely seen as yet.” (Victor Hugo)
5. But surely
there are some animals who can experience pain but lack a unified psychological
identity. Since these animals do not have a right to be treated with respect,
the philosophy of animal rights implies that we can treat them in any way we
choose.
Reply: It is true
that some animals, like shrimp and clams, may be capable of experiencing pain
yet lack most other psychological capacities. If this is true, then they will
lack some of the rights that other animals possess. However, there can be no
moral justification for causing anyone pain, if it is unnecessary to do so. And
since it is not necessary that humans eat shrimp, clams, and similar animals,
or utilize them in other ways, there can be no moral justification for causing
them the pain that invariably accompanies such use.
“The question
is not, ‘Can they reason?’ nor ‘Can they talk?’ but ‘Can they suffer?’” (Jeremy
Bentham)
6. Animals
don’t respect our rights. Therefore, humans have no obligation to respect their
rights either.
Reply: There are many
situations in which an individual who has rights is unable to respect the
rights of others. This is true of infants, young children, and mentally
enfeebled and deranged human beings. In their case we do not say that it is
perfectly all right to treat them disrespectfully because they do not honor our
rights. On the contrary, we recognize that we have a duty to treat them with
respect, even though they have no duty to treat us in the same way.
What is true of
cases involving infants, children, and the other humans mentioned, is no less
true of cases involving other animals. Granted, these animals do not have a
duty to respect our rights. But this does not erase or diminish our obligation
to respect theirs.
“The time will
come when people such as I will look upon the murder of (other) animals as they
now look upon the murder of human beings.” (Leonardo Da Vinci)
7. God gave
humans dominion over other animals. This is why we can do anything to them that
we wish, including eat them.
Reply: Not all
religions represent humans as having “dominion” over other animals, and even
among those that do, the notion of “dominion” should be understood as unselfish
guardianship, not selfish power. Humans are to be as loving toward all of
creation as God was in creating it. If we loved the animals today in the way
humans loved them in the Garden of Eden, we would not eat them. Those who
respect the rights of animals are embarked on a journey back to Eden—a journey
back to a proper love for God's creation.
“And God said,
Behold, I have given you every herb bearing seed, which is upon the face of all
the earth, and every tree, in which is the fruit of a tree yielding seed; to
you it shall be for meat.” (Genesis 1:29)
8. Only humans
have immortal souls. This gives us the right to treat the other animals as we
wish.
Reply: Many religions
teach that all animals, not just humans, have immortal souls. However, even if
only humans are immortal, this would only prove that we live forever whereas
other animals do not. And this fact (if it is a fact) would increase, not
decrease, our obligation to insure that this—the only life other animals
have—be as long and as good as possible.
“There is no
religion without love, and people may talk as much as they like about their
religion, but if it does not teach them to be good and kind to other animals as
well as humans, it is all a sham.” (Anna Sewell)
9. If we
respect the rights of animals, and do not eat or exploit them in other ways,
then what are we supposed to do with all of them? In a very short time they
will be running through our streets and homes.
Reply: Somewhere
between 4-5 billion animals are raised and slaughtered for food every year,
just in the United States [this number rose to more than 9 billion land animals
in 2023; globally, more than 85 billion land animals are slaughtered for meat
per year, which amounts to more than 2,500 per second]. The reason for this
astonishingly high number is simple: there are consumers who eat very large
amounts of animal flesh. The supply of animals meets the demand of buyers.
When the
philosophy of animal rights triumphs, however, and people become vegetarians,
we need not fear that there will be billions of cows and pigs grazing in the
middle of our cities or in our living rooms. Once the financial incentive for
raising billions of these animals evaporates, there simply will not be billions
of these animals. And the same reasoning applies in other cases—in the case of
animals bred for research, for example. When the philosophy of animal rights
prevails, and this use of these animals cease, then the financial incentive for
breeding millions of them will cease, too.
“The worst sin
toward our fellow creatures is not to hate them, but to be indifferent to them.
That is the essence of inhumanity.” (George Bernard Shaw)
10. Even if
other animals do have moral rights and should be protected, there are more
important things that need our attention—world hunger and child abuse, for
example, apartheid, drugs, violence to women, and the plight of the homeless.
After we take care of these problems, then we can worry about animal rights.
Reply: The animal
rights movement stands as part of, not apart from, the human rights movement.
The same philosophy that insists upon and defends the rights of nonhuman
animals also insists upon and defends the rights of human beings.
At a practical
level, moreover, the choice thoughtful people face is not between helping
humans or helping other animals. One can do both. People do not need to eat
animals in order to help the homeless, for example, any more than they need to
use cosmetics that have been tested on animals in order to help children. In
fact, people who do respect the rights of nonhuman animals, by not eating them,
will be healthier, in which case they actually will be able to help human
beings even more.
“I am in favor
of animal rights as well as human rights. That is the way of a whole human
being.” (Abraham Lincoln)
Notes
This pamphlet
was originally published and distributed by the Culture & Animals
Foundation. Learn more about their work at cultureandanimals.org.
Remarks in
square brackets are by the editor.
Quotes from
famous people are kept as in the original, although many of them cannot be
verified as authentic.
Biographical note
Dr. Tom Regan
was a kind and generous man and a friend to many. A philosopher by profession
and calling, he combined scholarly rigor and meticulous attention to detail
with the infectious passion of moral conviction. His life and work became the
compass by which numerous lives found direction and will continue to inspire
generations to come. As a young man, his own life was transformed by a literary
encounter with Mahatma Gandhi, which marked the beginning of his journey from
meat-eater to vegan, and to one of the most influential advocates for nonhuman
animals of his generation.
Born in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, on November 28, 1938, Tom Regan taught philosophy at North Carolina State University for 34 years. He wrote more than twenty books—including The Case for Animal Rights (1983)—and hundreds of academic articles, in which he developed the ideas sketched in the text at hand in great detail and with great skill. His autobiography in two parts, The Bird in the Cage: A Glimpse of My Life, was published in the second volume of Between the Species in 1986. Through countless lectures across the globe, he helped audiences see cows, pigs, chickens, sheep, goats, and other nonhuman animals as the unique somebodies they are—no less valuable than you and I. He died in Raleigh, North Carolina, on February 17, 2017.
Dr. Rainer
Ebert
Houston, United
States,
December 2025
Postscript
Animal rights
For me personally, Regan’s rights-based approach is
important. Both moral rights (ideas) and legal rights (laws) build a protective
fence around every individual. Others are prohibited from tearing down this
fence, no matter what you have done (as described by Regan in his book Empty
Cages). Think of the most evil person you can imagine (e.g., Hitler). It
would be prohibited—by human rights—to kill him. Yes, he would have to be
incarcerated for the rest of his life to keep others safe. The idea of human
rights—firmly established after World War II, at least in theory and often in
practice—is crucial for the survival of modern civilization. By civilization I
mean peaceful coexistence and democratic values: discussions, yes;
disagreements, yes; kidnapping, torture, slavery, lynching, assassinations,
executions – all of these: no.
The idea of animal rights—in the sense that it rejects all
slaughter and demands vegetarianism, not just out of personal compassion but as
a political demand—is built on the foundation of human rights. By definition, animal
rights include human rights.
There are other related ideas that demand respect for animals and
vegetarianism. I personally find them less useful. The term “animal liberation”
is intended to mean that we reject animal oppression and exploitation—not that
(as one horrified friend of mine assumed) we would propose to simply open every
cage in the zoo and watch the tigers and crocodiles kill everybody. “Animal
liberation” is an idea of social change.
Notably, Peter Singer’s utilitarian approach, presented in his book
Animal Liberation, allows some forms of animal exploitation, if they are
useful for many others. This goes against animal rights. Similarly, the idea of
rejecting “speciesism”, the discrimination of animals, because it is unjust, is
logical. But it isn’t useful if we treat everyone badly, if no one has rights.
A journey into
the unknown?
If you find Regan’s arguments convincing and have decided to
support animal rights, the next logical step is to be a vegetarian, or really,
a vegan. As animal rights supporters and vegetarians, we move in interesting
territory. The ground is solid. We can be confident that vegetarian and vegan
diets can be healthy and safe. But we are moving along the edges of
well-explored territory, sometimes stepping into the unknown. A vegetarian—let
alone vegan—country does not yet exist on Earth. Animal rights are morally
convincing (to many). They are also legally possible, but only if a majority of
people were to agree with us. We are talking about a realizable utopia: we know
how to construct it, but it is visionary.
To change where we could go, we must recognize where we are. It’s
like we are entering unknown territory or a metaphorical “jungle”. It could be
dangerous. Why? Because social change brings with it dangers and unintended
consequences. This is not a problem exclusive to the vegan or animal rights
“movement”. It is a tragic lesson learned from the fight for civil rights and
women’s rights. The animal rights movement, however, is peculiar. Apart from
certain religions with dietary rules, it is the first social movement that
demands that we change our diet. Importantly, for many decades, millions of
people have already moved into this “unknown” vegan territory. Moreover, the
vegan territory has crept and is expanding into formerly omnivore lands.
Nevertheless, many mistakes have been made, and many lessons have
been learned. Why not use this “insider knowledge” and travel more comfortably?
Rumour has it, and I agree, that there are two main areas where problems often
occur: (1) nutrition and (2) social life.
(1) Nutrition
The earliest books that combined the ideas of animal rights and
vegetarianism are from the late 1800s—particularly, Henry Salt’s book Animals’
Rights from 1892. Back then, nutrition science was barely born yet. The
vitamins, essential for humans, were discovered in the first half of the 1900s.
The first organization self-defined as vegan, the Vegan Society in England, was
founded in 1944. The last vitamin to be discovered—vitamin B12—was isolated
about four years later. Many ideas about nutrition from classic 19th-century
vegetarian books have been repeated in the vegetarian movement until the
present day.
In the meantime, however, nutrition science has uncovered several
potential problems and their solutions. Let’s use this knowledge.
As a nutrition scientist and a long-term vegan, I recommend the
following. Let’s call them the six golden rules of vegan nutrition:
1)
Instead
of animal products, eat legumes and legume-based foods (e.g., tofu, soya
milk).
o
Legumes
are great sources of protein, iron, and zinc.
2)
Take
a vitamin B12 supplement—unless you consume B12-fortified foods more or
less daily.
o
Take
about 10–50 micrograms per day OR about 2,000 micrograms once per week.
3)
Get
enough vitamin D from a supplement (about 20–25 µg per day) or from
sunshine.
4)
Get
enough iodine from iodized salt, seaweed (e.g., nori, wakame), or a
supplement (100–150 micrograms per day).
5)
Try
to consume a source of omega-3 fatty acids regularly, e.g., flaxseed
oil, rapeseed (canola) oil, walnuts, or hempseeds.
6)
Consume
calcium-rich foods on a daily basis, e.g., calcium-fortified foods, napa
cabbage, bok choy, or broccoli.
Notes:
· A vegan multinutrient supplement can be practical as it contains
vitamin B12, vitamin D, and iodine.
· Vitamin B12 is the most important. Most ovo-lacto-vegetarians
should also take a B12 supplement.
· A healthy diet includes plenty of fruit, vegetables, whole grains,
and legumes, as well as nuts/seeds and healthy plant oils.
· You can find more information at ivu.org or vegansociety.com.
(2) Social life
When Donald Watson—the man who coined the word “vegan”—was asked
“What do you find most difficult about being vegan?”, he replied: “Well, I
suppose it is the social aspect”.
When you become a vegetarian—and especially vegan—you may run into
“problems” with omnivores as well as vegans. Some omnivores will be supportive.
But others might get angry, offended, annoyed, or “defensive”. Some may try to blame every little health
problem that you have on your vegan diet.
Back in 1944, Donald Watson wrote: “We may be sure that should
anything so much as a pimple ever appear to mar the beauty of our physical
form, it will be entirely due in the eyes of the world to our own silly fault
for not eating ‘proper food’.”
Meeting other vegetarians, vegans, and animal rights supporters can
be great. They can share tips, provide moral support, and are often wonderful
people. We are, however, talking about a truly diverse group here. It is likely
that you will meet vegans and then find some of their opinions or personality
traits quite “interesting” (as they say in England) or “horrible” (as we say in
Germany).
Humans are known to be difficult. Being a vegetarian, vegan, or
animal rights supporter can make things more difficult. But following a
few basic rules can make things easier. Below are some tips. Let’s call them the
four golden rules of not going crazy:
1)
Do
not preach. Millions of vegans have tried and failed. Choose “teach by
example”, try to be a “joyful vegan”, use “friendly activism”. Avoid “pushy
activism”.
2)
Know
your boundaries. Ask to be respected. Respect others. Tolerate each other’s
differences. It wouldn’t be called “tolerance” if it were easy.
3)
Meet
other vegetarians and vegans—they can often help you. Don’t expect them to be
perfect or a “genie in a bottle”.
4)
Take
care of your health. Don’t be a fanatic. Nothing in life is 100% consistent.
What is the
conclusion?
In terms of nutrition, vegan diets
can be very healthy but, of course, a vegan diet is not automatically healthy.
The key determinants are making sure you get the key nutrients, especially
vitamin B12, and that, ideally, you centre your diet largely around “whole
foods”. A centuries-old question that still sometimes pops up is: “Are humans
anatomical omnivores?”. But from the viewpoint of modern nutritional
epidemiology—nutrition studies with humans—that is not a relevant question at
all. This question is also highly oversimplified. The question to ask is: What
do studies with vegans show? They show that vegan diets can be very healthy.
In terms of the social aspect, never
in history has it been easier, more convenient, and more socially accepted to
be vegan. In my opinion, it can be a useful strategy to accept an
“ethical paradox”: one the one hand, to call for animal rights, to recognize
that animal rights demand vegetarianism, and that consistent vegetarianism
means veganism—while, on the other hand, holding the view that everyone has the
right to choose their own diet. Logically, this can seem inconsistent. It can
seem like making a political demand for animal rights while at the same time
generously tolerating the violation of those rights. But it is a strategy that
can help omnivores “tolerate” your views, which makes your life easier and can
help you—paraphrasing Colleen Patrick‑Goudreau—be a “joyful vegan”. It can also
help animals, because it builds bridges toward animal rights rather than
building walls.
I personally like this approach. I
do not like the sectarian, self-sacrificing, self-tormenting, workaholic,
martyr-style approaches. In the words of Mephistopheles, in Goethe’s
early-19th-century play Faust: “one does not have to torment oneself all
too anxiously”. And this is Mephistopheles—a kind of demon and nihilistic
spirit—speaking. If you don’t like demons, go with Donald Watson. At age 94,
when asked about his own accomplishments, he said: “Being a hedonist, providing
I do not harm myself, other people, or animals, or the planet.”
Dr. Christian Koeder
Ellwangen, Germany
February 2026
