Note on antisemitism: Note that the following text contains antisemitic language. Antisemitism does not seem to have been a central aspect of Schopenhauer's theories - his antisemitic remarks are more like "side notes". First, he contrasts the Old Testament, which he sees as presenting Judaism, with the New Testament, presenting Christianity, blaming the ill-treatment of animals on the Jewish tradition. Conversely, he blames Christianity and aspects of the German and English languages for morally disregarding animals, contrasting this with "the old languages" (he might not be referring to Hebrew) that, he says, did not have these flaws (he might be thinking of Latin and Old Greek). However, his antisemitic remarks go further than blaming the "Jewish" Old Testament. In the text below, but also in other parts of the same "prize essay" not cited here, he uses the term "foetor Judaicus" - vaguely referring to a "Jewish stench". For the diverse potential meanings of this term, see, for example, the US Holocaust Memorial Museum's explanation here (excerpt: "Foetor judaicus was used as an extension of several unsubstantiated myths. Its perceived existence was used to legitimize other antisemitic beliefs and it was an invented consequence of Jews’ supposed wicked actions."). The notable differences in this regard between the 1881 edition cited here and the 1841 edition are noteworthy—see the remarks inserted in square brackets, particularly those highlighted in turquoise.
I'm not an expert in antisemitism nor in Schopenhauer, so I cannot put his remarks into historical context. This text was written a long time before the "Nazi time" in Germany, which provides some limited context but does not, of course, excuse his antisemitism, particularly since he lived in Frankfurt, a city with a large Jewish community, and since he did not have the excuse of being an uneducated ignoramus from the countryside, with no knowledge of the world and other cultures, who just did not know any better (the German equivalent of a "bumpkin" -- no offence to bumpkins; I'm one).
Side note 1: It has been stated that Max Horkheimer credited Schopenhauer for drawing attention to the similarities between human suffering and exploitation and that of non-humans (see here). Horkheimer was not a vegetarian either.
Side note 2: It is noteworthy that Schopenhauer uses the term "the rights of animals" (this is found in the 1881 edition but not the 1841 edition). However, he seems to have used the term more in the sense of legal protection for animals, i.e., animal welfare laws.
Side note 3: Schopenhauer does not seem to have been a vegetarian. Below he says "animal food", which I would guess meant to include meat and fish. While he is very likely right, that a vegan diet would not have been healthily possible in the 19th century, a healthy vegetarian or pescatarian diet, given access to a varied diet, which Schopenhauer would have had, would quite likely have been possible. This is not really related to "North" or "South" (geographical residence - it's cold in the North) as Schopenhauer suggested.
Side note 4: The text of §19, section 7, seems to have been written in 1839, and then originally published in 1840 as the prize essay. However, in the footnote, there is a mention of 1855, which must have been added for the 1881 edition. Schopenhauer died in 1860. It therefore appears that Schopenhauer made the changes that I highlighted in yellow or turquoise at some point between April 1855 and September 1860. It is also theoretically conceivable that an editor or publisher made some of these insertions.
Side note 5: He writes "in the Hampshire" as if he did not mean the county Hampshire. It's not clear to me what he meant, maybe something like "in town" or "in the village".
Side note 6: The text below (section 7), including the antisemitic remarks, also appears in the German vegetarian periodical Vegetarische Warte (June 1931; volume 64, pages 122–128). I have not checked the version in the Vegetarische Warte in detail, but it appears to be the 1881 version, including the metion of "foetor Judaicus" and "Judaized".
[Section 7 of §19 seems to have been written originally in 1839 - see text]
Cited from:
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The two fundamental problems of ethics [1881]
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The
two fundamental problems
of
ethics,
treated
in two academic prize essays
by
Dr. Arthur Schopenhauer,
Member of the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences.
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Third Edition.
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I. On the freedom of the human will, crowned by the Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences, at Trondheim, on January 26, 1839.
II. On the foundation of morality, not crowned by the Royal Danish Society of Sciences, at Copenhagen, on January 30, 1840.
Leipzig:
F. A. Brockhaus
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1881.
Contents.
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Prize essay on the freedom of the will.
[I–V]
[…]
Prize essay on the foundation of morality
[I–IV]
I. Introduction.
[§ 1–2]
[…]
II. Critique of the foundation given by Kant to ethics.
[§ 3–11]
[…]
III. Foundation of ethics.
[§ 12–20]
[…]
§. 19.
Confirmations of the expounded basis of morality
[This chapter on pages 231–249, 1881 edition]
[1–9]
[…]
[Section 7, on pages 238–245]
[The text highlighted in turquoise does not appear in the 1841 edition.]
7) The moral incentive established by me proves itself as the genuine one further in that it also takes animals under its protection, for which in the other European moral systems such irresponsibly poor provision is made. The supposed rightlessness of animals, the delusion that our actions toward them are without moral significance, or, as it is called in the language of that morality, that there are no duties toward animals, is downright a revolting coarseness and barbarism of the Occident, whose source lies in Judaism [The 1841 edition says: "whose source may perhaps lie in Judaism".]. In philosophy it rests on the assumption, contrary to all evidence, of a complete difference between man and animal, which, as is well known, was most decisively and glaringly pronounced by Descartes, as a necessary consequence of his errors. For when the Cartesian-Leibnizian-Wolfian philosophy constructed rational psychology out of abstract concepts and constructed an immortal anima rationalis, then the natural claims of the animal world obviously found themselves in opposition this exclusive privilege and immortality-patent of the human species, and nature, as on all such occasions, silently lodged its protest. Now the philosophers, frightened by their intellectual conscience, had to seek to support rational through empirical psychology and therefore be endeavoring to open up a monstrous gulf, an immeasurable distance between humans and animals, in order, contrary to all evidence, to depict them as fundamentally different. Boileau already mocks such efforts:
Les animaux ont-ils des universités?
[Do animals have universities?]
Voit-on fleurir chez eux des quatre facultés ?
[Do we see the four faculties flourishing among them?]
According to this, animals were supposed to not even know how to distinguish themselves from the external world and to have no consciousness of themselves, no I! Against such tasteless assertions one need only point to the boundless egoism dwelling in every, even the smallest and last, animal, which sufficiently testifies how very conscious animals are of their own self, the world, and the non-self. If such a Cartesian [1841 edition: "Leibnitzian".] found himself between the claws of a tiger, he would most clearly perceive what sharp distinction such a tiger makes between his self and non-self. Corresponding to such sophistications of the philosophers, we find, on the popular path, the peculiarity of certain languages, notably German, that they have entirely separate words for the eating, drinking, pregnancy, giving birth, dying, and the corpse of animals, in order not to have to use those [words] which designate these acts in humans, and thus to conceal under the diversity of words the complete identity of the subject. Since the ancient languages do not know such a duplicity of expressions, but unbiasedly describe the same thing with the same word; so that wretched manipulation is without doubt the work of European priestcraft, which, in its profanity, does not believe it can go far enough in denying and blaspheming the eternal essence which lives in all animals; whereby it has laid the foundation for the harshness and cruelty toward animals customary in Europe, upon which a High Asian can only look with justified abhorrence. In the English language we do not encounter that despicable manipulation; without doubt, because the Saxons, when they conquered England, were not yet Christians. On the other hand, an analogue of it is found in the peculiarity that in English all animals are generis neutrius [!; should be: generis neutri; of neuter gender] and are therefore represented by the pronoun it, just like lifeless things; which, especially with the primates, and dogs, monkeys, etc., turns out quite outrageous and is unmistakably a priestly trick to degrade animals to things. The ancient Egyptians, whose entire life was devoted to religious purposes, placed in the same burial vaults the mummies of humans and those of ibises, crocodiles, etc.: but in Europe it is an abhorrence and crime when the faithful dog is buried beside the resting place of his master, upon which he has sometimes, out of a loyalty and attachment such as is not found in humankind, awaited his own death. – Nothing leads more decidedly to the recognition of the identity of the essential in the appearance of animals and that of humans than occupation with zoology and anatomy: what then should one say when today (1839) a pietistic zootomist presumes to urge an absolute and radical difference between human and animal and goes so far in this as to attack and disparage the honest zoologists who, far from all priestcraft, eye-service and Tartuffian hypocrisy, pursue their way at the hand of nature and truth?
One must truly be blind in all senses, or totally chloroformed by the foetor Judaicus, not to recognize that the essential and principal thing in animals and in humans is the same and that what distinguishes both does not lie in the primary, in the principle, in the archaeus, in the inner essence, in the core of both appearances, as which in the one as in the other is the will of the individual, but solely in the secondary, in the intellect, in the degree of cognitive capacity, which in humans, through the added faculty of abstract cognition, called reason, is an incomparably higher one, yet demonstrably only by virtue of a greater cerebral development, that is, of the somatic difference of a single part, the brain, and namely in its quantity. On the other hand, there is incomparably more that is similar between animals and humans, both physically and somatically. One must remind such an occidental, Judaized despiser of animals and idolater of reason that, just as he was suckled by his mother, so too was the dog suckled by his. That even Kant fell into this error of his contemporaries and countrymen, I have censured above. That the morality of Christianity does not consider animals is a deficiency of it which it is better to admit than to perpetuate, and at which one must be all the more astonished as this morality otherwise shows the greatest agreement with that of Brahmanism and Buddhism, only less strongly expressed and not carried through to the extremes; so one can hardly doubt that it, just as the idea of a God become human (avatar), originates from India and may have come via Egypt to Judea; so that Christianity would be a reflection of Indian primordial light from the ruins of Egypt, which however unfortunately fell on Jewish soil. As a neat symbol of the just-censured deficiency in Christian morality, despite its otherwise great agreement with the Indian, one could regard the circumstance that John the Baptist appears quite in the manner of a Jewish Sannyasi, but – clothed in animal skins! which, as is well known, would be an abhorrence to every Hindu; since even the Royal Society of Calcutta received its copy of the Vedas only under the promise that it would not have it bound in leather, according to European fashion: hence it is found in their library bound in silk. A similar, characteristic contrast is offered by the Gospel story of Peter's catch of fish, which the Savior, through a miracle, blesses to such an extent that the boats are filled with fish to the point of sinking (Luke 5), with the story of Pythagoras, initiated in Egyptian wisdom, who buys from the fishermen their catch, while the net is still under water, in order then to grant all the captured fish their freedom (Apul. de magia, p. 36. Bip.). — Compassion for animals is so closely connected with goodness of character that one can confidently assert that whoever is cruel to animals cannot be a good person. This compassion also shows itself as sprung from the same source as the virtue to be practiced toward humans. Thus, for example, sensitive persons, upon remembering that they, in a bad mood, in anger, or heated by wine, have maltreated their dog, their horse, their monkey in an undeserved or unnecessary way, or beyond measure, will feel the same remorse, the same dissatisfaction with themselves, which is felt upon remembering an injustice committed against humans, where it is called the voice of the punishing conscience. I remember having read that an Englishman who in India, on the hunt, had shot a monkey, could not forget the look which the monkey cast upon him while dying, and thereafter never again shot at monkeys. Likewise Wilhelm Harris, a true Nimrod, who, merely to enjoy the pleasure of hunting, traveled in the years 1836 and 1837 deep into the interior of Africa. In his journey, published in 1838 in Bombay, he relates that, after he had killed the first elephant, a female, and on the following morning sought out the fallen animal, all other elephants had fled from the area: only the young of the fallen one had spent the night with the dead mother, now came, forgetting all fear, toward the hunters with the liveliest and clearest manifestations of its inconsolable misery, and embraced them with its small trunk, to implore their help. There, says Harris, a true remorse over his deed seized him and he felt as if he had committed a murder. This sensitive English nation we see, above all others, distinguished by an outstanding compassion for animals, which manifests itself on every occasion and has had the power to move this nation, despite the otherwise degrading "cold superstition," [1841: a nation obsessed with a degrading belief in letters] to fill, through legislation, the gap left in morality by religion. For this gap precisely is the reason why in Europe and America animal-protection societies are needed, which can indeed only work with the help of justice and police.
In Asia the religions grant the animals sufficient protection, so there no one thinks of such societies. Meanwhile in Europe the sense for the rights of animals is also awakening more and more, to the extent that the strange notions of an animal world that has come into existence merely for the use and amusement of humans, in consequence of which animals are treated entirely as things, are gradually fading and disappearing. For these are the source of the crude and very inconsiderate treatment of animals in Europe, and I have demonstrated that this has its origin in the Old Testament in the second volume of Parerga, §. 178. To the glory of the English [1841: their glory], then, let it be said that among them first the law has quite seriously taken [1814: quite seriously takes] animals under protection against cruel treatment, and the villain really must atone for having transgressed against animals, even if they are his property. Indeed, not yet satisfied with this, there exists in London a society, voluntarily assembled, for the protection of animals, "Society for the prevention of cruelty to animals", which, in private ways, with considerable expenditure, does very much to counteract animal cruelty. Their emissaries watch secretly, in order afterwards to appear as denouncers of the tormentors of voiceless, sentient beings, and everywhere one has to fear their presence*).
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[FOOTNOTE START]
*) How seriously the matter is taken is shown by the following quite recent example, which I translate from the Birmingham Journal of December 1839: "Arrest of a company of 84 dog-baiters. – Since it had been learned that yesterday on the square in Fox Street in Birmingham a dog-baiting was to take place, the Society of animal lovers took precautionary measures to secure the help of the police, of which a strong detachment marched to the battleground and, as soon as it had been admitted, arrested the entire company that was present. These participants were now bound together in pairs with handcuffs and then the whole united in the middle by a long rope: thus they were led to the police station, where the mayor with the magistrate held session. The two principal persons were each sentenced to a fine of 1 pound sterling together with 8 ½ shillings costs and in case of non-payment to 14 days hard labour in the penitentiary. The others were released." – The dandies, who never tend to be absent at such noble pleasures, must have looked very embarrassed in the procession. — But an even stricter example from more recent times we find in the Times of April 6, 1855, p. 6, and indeed actually set by this newspaper itself. For it reports the judicially pursued case of the daughter of a very wealthy Scottish Baronet, who had tortured her horse most cruelly, with cudgel and knife, for which she had been sentenced to a fine of five pounds sterling. But such a girl makes nothing of this, and would thus actually have hopped away unpunished, if the Times had not followed with the right and sensitive chastisement, in that, setting down the first and last names of the girl twice, in large letters, they continue: "We cannot refrain from saying that a couple of months imprisonment, together with some, privately, but by the sturdiest woman in the Hampshire applied floggings would have been a much more fitting punishment for Miss N. N. Such a wretch has forfeited all considerations and privileges due to her sex: "we can no longer regard her as a woman." — I dedicate these newspaper reports especially to the associations against animal cruelty now established in Germany, so that they may see how one must tackle it, if something is to become of it; notwithstanding that, I pay my full recognition to the praiseworthy diligence of Mr. Werner Hofrath in Munich, who has entirely devoted himself to this branch of charity and has spread the impetus for it all over Germany.[FOOTNOTE END]
At steep bridges in London, the Society keeps a team of horses, which is put before every heavily loaded wagon free of charge. Is that not beautiful? Does it not compel our applause, just as well as a benefaction toward humans? Additionally, the "Philanthropic Society in London" for its part, in the year 1837, offered a prize of 30 pounds, for the best presentation of moral reasons against animal cruelty, which however were to be taken mainly from Christianity, whereby the task was as a matter of fact made more difficult: the prize was awarded in 1839 to Mr. Macnamara. In Philadelphia there exists, for similar purposes, an "Animals friends Society". To the president of the same T. Forster (an Englishman) has dedicated his book "Philozoia, moral reflections on the actual condition of animals and the means of improving the same" (Brussels 1839). The book is original and well written. As an Englishman the author naturally seeks to also base his exhortations to humane treatment of animals on the Bible, but slips everywhere; so that he finally grasps at the argument that Jesus Christ was indeed born in the stable with an ox and a donkey, whereby it would be symbolically implied that we are to regard the animals as our brothers and to treat them accordingly. — Everything cited here testifies that the moral string in question is gradually beginning to sound also in the occidental world. That compassion for animals need, by the way, not lead so far that we, like the Brahmans, would have to abstain from animal food, rests on the fact that in nature the capacity for suffering keeps equal pace with intelligence; wherefore humans through deprivation of animal food, especially in the North, would suffer more than the animal through a quick and always unforeseen death, which one, however, should alleviate further by means of chloroform. Without animal food, on the other hand, humankind could not even continue to exist in the North. According to the same standard humans also have animals work for them, and only the excess of the imposed exertion becomes cruelty.
[…]
IV. On the metaphysical interpretation of the ethical primal phenomenon.
[§ 21–22]
[…]
